Wash, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947.
Chapitre:
(Part 2, Continuation of Part 1, starting from July 26,1944)
http://www.fatherswar.com/…/w…/WW2_28history/28history2.html
The Breakout
On the 26th of July the 28th Infantry jumped off and met strong resistance immediately. The enemy mortar fire heavy and extremely accurate. He had established an observation post in the tower of a church in Miliers, which commanded observation of the major portion of the Division's front. It proved very difficult to destroy the observation post as both Corps and Division artillery fired on it for two days before it was relinquished as an observation post.
The 1st and 2nd Battalions with two companies of Tanks, two companies of Tank Destroyers, two platoons of AAA's, and a company of Engineers attached, jumped off. Heavy mine fields both Teller and anti-personnel, covered the route of advance assigned to the two battalions, Engineers were kept busy clearing paths through the mine fields so the infantry could advance. The area immediately to the front of the line of departure became an inferno of lead and shrapnel. Officers and NCO's became casualties and the companies became disorganized, and it was only through the work of the remaining officers and NCO's who heroically reorganized their units under the most difficult conditions that they were able to continue with the attack. First Sergeant Auchenbach, Company C, for the second time in two weeks, when his officers became casualties, assumed command, reorganizing his company and led it on.
An enemy tank attack forced the Battalions to stop after an advance of about 500 yards. In the early afternoon a coordinated attack was again launched by both Battalions, and the advance moved forward fairly well. The anti-personnel mine fields stopped the Second Battalion advance considerably, but by 1900 the battalions had reached the main road running east and west between Perriers and Lessay.
Small islands of resistance were encountered during the afternoon, especially in the Second Battalion sector. The Third Battalion moved behind the leading battalion and mopped up snipers and small groups of enemy which had been bypassed by the First and Second Battalions. The First Battalion received a counterattack at 2000 which the enemy supported with a few tanks. This attack died down about 2200 hours and the forward battalion established local security for the night with an outpost line along the highway. The total advance that day was over 2,500 yards.
On July 27, due to the fact that the 121st Infantry on the left had not advanced as far as the 28th, the Regiment was ordered to hold the lines established the day before, until the other Regiment could gain contact with the 28th on the Periers-Lessay road, at which time a coordinated attack would be launched.
The 121st did not come up on the line until early afternoon, and the time for the attack was set for 1500. At that time the First and Second Battalions again jumped off and by nightfall had advanced to the high ground south of Miliers. Anti-personnel mines again played a big part in slowing the advance, and all roads had to be swept. A few vehicles were lost because of this and the Engineers worked day and night to clear the roads. The advance for the day was approximately 3,000, but it permitted the advance of two adjacent divisions.
This marked the beginning of the large scale retreat of the German Seventh Army. The Fourth and Sixth Armored Divisions were already passing through The Division, and the Germans were on the aring out small pockets of resistance and securing roads nets and vital installations along the route of march. During the period the Regiment remained near Rennes, personnel had showers, were issued new clothes and had a well earned rest. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were ordered to establish road blocks, blocking off roads leading from the south and east. Motorized patrols were maintained between outposts. Many German supply installations were uncovered during this period including warehouses and ammunition dumps, a number of prisoners were picked up and much useful information was gained pertaining to German defense plans in other areas.
On August 8,1944 the 1st Battalion was attached to Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division ordered to the vicinity of Landivisiau on the Brittany Peninsula. At Huelgoat a guide was to meet the Battalion and lead it over a comparatively safe route to Landivisiau, upon arrival at Huelgoat no guide was found. Apparently the Battalion had arrived sooner than expected. After a reasonable wait the Battalion Commander decided to route the Battalion along back roads suggested by a Free French guide, as the main road was still held by the enemy. When the battalion arrived at St. Theognnec, darkness has set in and Free French there reported that there were no American troops in Landivisiau and that the enemy had infiltrated into the town from the north and northeast.
The battalion bivouacked near the road and a patrol was sent back to Huelgoat to await the arrival of the guide, at daybreak the patrol returned with the guide and the Battalion moved into bivouac in the vicinity of Plabennec. The Battalion Commander reported to the Commanding General of Combat Command A where a mission was assigned and general plans concerning the containing and capture of the fortress city of Brest were discussed. Their mission was to help contain and feel out the enemy strong points, until the rest of the Division and Corps could arrive and begin the attack. During this period casualties were fairly heavy, due to the fact that this type of fighting; attacking heavily fortified positions was new to the men. The men learned fast and by the time the remainder of the regiment joined them, they were past masters at this type of fighting. This was the beginning of the Battle of Brest.
The Battle for Brest
At Brest, an estimated 50,000 enemy troops were trapped within an arc drawn dan tightly around the city and its port, the second largest in France. The German Commander of he port, Lt. Gen. Hermann Bernhard Ramcke, was a ruthless solider who had previously led the German airborne invasion of Crete. He was under the direct orders of Adolph Hitler to hold out at for a least four months, and had already refused two Allied demands for surrender. The troops under his command included three German Division and a number of marine and labor battalions. The defenses of the old city on the tip of the Brittany peninsula were as formidable a series of strong points as were encountered anywhere in France, and they were bolstered by numerous heavy coast artillery guns which had been turned around to fire inland.
On August 14, a task force composed of the 3rd Battalion, pus one platoon Cannon Company, one battery of Field Artillery, one company of T.D.'s, and one company of 4.2 Mortars, received orders to proceed to the vicinity of Cap de Frehal to clean up a pocket of about 300 Germans who were reported there, being held by Free French forces. After a few brief skirmishes, in which the enemy saw that our forces were two powerful for them, the Germans totaling 293 surrendered. The remainder of the Regiment less the 2nd Battalion, which had been left in Rennes on guard duty, joined the 3rd Battalion. The Regiment then received orders to join the 1st Battalion at Landernau. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to move from Rennes to Landernau, and the Regiment was together once again. Outposts were established by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions on the Landernau-Brest road. The 1st Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. B.C. Chapla, visited the Command Post and gave them much valuable information on the enemy positions, types of troops and terrain features.
On August 20, the Regiment was relieved by elements of the Second Division and moved into a new position in the center of the line. The divisions of the American VII Corps, the 2nd, 29th, and 8th were assigned the battle for Brest. Tremendous artillery strength was brought up to assist in the attack. The Corps plan was to use all three division to close in on the German defenders from three sides. The 2nd Division was to attack from the east, the 29th from the west, and the 8th Division was to make the main effort with a frontal attack from the north.
Shortly before midnight on August 24, elements of the 13th and 28th Regiments, began infiltrating toward the preliminary objectives from which the attack was to jump off. With the 2nd Battalion on the right, 3rd Battalion on the left, the move was made forward without encountering enemy opposition. Patrols were sent forward with the mission to contact the enemy, but reported no enemy contacted in that area. At 0130 hours the attack began, after advancing 500 yards, the Battalions ran into heavy artillery and mortar fire and were slowed up. At the end of the day, an advance of 1,200 yards had been made against heavy resistance.
Enemy resistance increased during the following day and it was found necessary to commit the 1st Battalion less Company A which was in Regimental reserve, on the right of 3rd Battalion. They received very heavy enemy fire on their way to the line of departure, and were not able to cross it until 1750 hours that afternoon. The following day the three Battalions jumped off together, but were unable to make any progress during the day and a night attack was ordered. The Battalions again running into trouble, Company C was unable to advance due to heavy mortar and machine gun fire. The 1st Battalion reported that they were unable to make objective because of flares and continuous machine gun fire. After a slight gain the 3rd Battalion was forced to withdraw to their previous positions. The 2nd Battalion ran into less opposition and at 0610 hours Company G reported that they were on objective, at 0645 hours Company E reported that they were on objective. Patrols were sent out from Company F to contact and protect the flanks of Companies E and G. At 0720 word was received the Companies E and G were being fired upon their rear by enemy who had been bypassed during the night. The 3rd Battalion reported that a captured tank was being used by the enemy and was firing on the 2nd Battalion from the rear of Company G, and a report of more German mechanized activity, with mortar and flanking machine gun fire was received from Company G. At 0930 hours the 3rd Battalion reported that a truce had been called to evacuate the dead and wounded, the truce to over at 1155 hours. At 1220 hours communication with Companies E and G severed and an officer patrol was sent out ton investigate. An artillery forward observer reported two companies of U.S. troops moving south toward Brest, troops appeared to be prisoners and were believed to be Companies E and G having been cut off and captured. The reserve company, Company A was moved into position vacated by Company E. On the following day plans were made for the relief of the 28th by the 121st Infantry. On August 31,1944, Col. K.S. Anderson as relived from command and Colonel Merrit E. Omstead assumed command.
Casualties suffered during this period were as follows:
Officers Enlisted
Missing in Action..............10..............265
Wounded in Action..............20..............398
Killed in Action................6...............89
Non Battle Injuries.............4..............136
From August 31 to September 10, the Regiment remained in Division reserve, at which time it was moved to the vicinity of Coat-Ly-Ogan, less the 2nd Battalion which remained in Division reserve, to relive elements of the 29th Division which had been making only limited gains in its sector. This consisted mainly of patrolling and keeping contact with the enemy. Finally orders were received on September 13 that the Regiment would be replaced by the 29th Division, and that on the 14th of September, they began a move to the Crozon Peninsula.